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Abstract This article improves our understanding of the reasons underlying
the intellectual migration of scientists from existing cognitive domains to nascent
scientific fields. To that purpose we present, first, a number of findings from the
sociology of science that give different insights about scientific migration. We then
attempt to bring some of these insights together under the conceptual roof of an
actor-based approach linking expected utility and diffusion theory. Intellectual
migration is seen as the choice of scientists who decide under uncertainty and on
the base of estimations about probabilities, costs, and benefits of the migration. The
resulting choice model can be used as a heuristic base for further exploration of
the subject.
Keywords Scientific innovation  Theory  Diffusion
Introduction
An essential part of understanding innovation processes is to know how a scientific
discovery becomes part of the scientific canon, or said differently, how a new
scientific idea is diffused within the scientific community and becomes institu-
tionalised as a new scientific field.
Our main interest in this article is to understand an essential part of this process:
the diffusion of scientific inventions would be impossible if there were no scientists
being prepared to migrate from existing fields of knowledge to new ones. Migration
of scientists means to embrace new ideas, artefacts, methods, or practices that are
still relatively unknown and uncertain in their working and make them the base of
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future research activities. It means the willingness to switch from research activities
in established disciplines, specialties, subspecialties or established research areas to
research activities in cognitive areas still in exploration and development. Though it
seems as if this would be ‘‘normal’’ scientific procedure, one cannot assume that
scientists will migrate without thinking twice. They are socialised in certain
disciplines and specialties; they have invested in a knowledge domain, often for a
considerable time; their networks are built around the cognitive field they are
mastering; and their reputation is constructed on the base of their achievements in
the existing field. Intellectual migration means accepting uncertainties about future
positions and scientific recognition. This is why it is worthwhile to look deeper into
the conditions that explain migration or non-migration of scientists into new and
unexplored fields. A coherent theoretical framework that can serve as a heuristics
for hypothesis development and empirical research is still lacking.
In order to advance on this point, one can build on various insights from the
sociology of science dealing with ‘‘scientific growth’’, the cognitive and academic
development of science. These insights will be presented in the following section.
It turns out, however, that these insights remain fragmented and do not add up to a
coherent approach. It is our concern in this article to bring these insights together
and link them to a model of decision-making of scientists about scientific migration
(section ‘‘A Choice Model of Scientific Migration’’). Diffusion theory will then be
used to explain how individual decisions of scientists can add up to a collective
process of scientific migration to new fields (section ‘‘Diffusion’’).
Insights from the Sociology of Science
One can distinguish three broad approaches to conceptualise the choice situation of
scientists when being confronted with new developments: the ‘‘cognitive’’ approach
with a view of the scientists as an ‘‘epistemic agent’’; the ‘‘reputational approach’’
underlining the unlimited competition of scientists and the vision of scientists as
‘‘reputation-seekers’’; and, finally, the ‘‘invisible college’’ approach stressing the
cooperative and social elements in scientists’ decision-making. Each approach is not
built on one coherent theoretical device but the studies share a number of basic
assumptions and interests in explaining the choice situation in science. Our aim in
this paper is to demonstrate that these approaches are not mutually exclusive but
that the different elements they emphasise can be brought together under one
conceptual roof furnished by expected utility theory.
Cognitive Dynamics and ‘‘Epistemic Agents’’ Matter
Approaches highlighting the cognitive aspects of scientific development see scientists
above all as ‘‘epistemic agents’’ looking for opportunities to develop new ideas.
Scientists as epistemic agents are intrinsically driven to do research because it
gives them intellectual satisfaction. They are curious by nature and love to explore
new opportunities. Such a vision of the scientist can be found throughout the
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different contributions to the sociology of science. More recently, Lamont stressed
‘‘pleasure and curiosity’’ as a primordial motivation in scientists’ decisions (Lamont
2010). Manathunga discovers in her study the ‘‘intense emotional and intellectual
rewards’’ that influence the decision of scientists to go into interdisciplinary areas
(Manathunga 2009). Akerlind, finally (A˚kerlind 2008), has, on the basis of several
studies, found ’’self-development’’ as one of four personal motivations of scientists.
‘‘There is a primary focus on satisfying the researcher’s curiosity and enhancing
their personal understanding of an issue, with accompanying feelings of enthusiasm
and interest in the research’’ (ibid.: 26). These authors do not deny other
motivational drives but intellectual satisfaction out of scientific discovery is
certainly a primary one in cognitive development.
Epistemic agents seize cognitive opportunities when they can. The literature on
cognitive dynamics is above all directed to the different structures and dynamics of
the cognitive field of science that are at the root of such opportunities.
Holton (1962), for example, proposes a model in which scientific fields consist of
a limited stock of available ‘‘ideas’’ that scientists can use. New and unexplored
fields offer plenty of occasions for scientists to satisfy curiosity, as the stock of ideas
is still full. These occasions diminish the more scientists enter into this field. The
stock of available ideas becomes gradually depleted. This is the time to look for
other unexplored fields that, however, build on the existing one. Migration takes
place (see similarly also Edge 1990).
Others, like Ben-David (1991), see scientific development as a constant
differentiation of knowledge fields generated as a consequence of an ever-increasing
stock of knowledge. The complexity of available knowledge leads scientists to find
specialised topics and proliferate the paradigm in new contexts. Migration in this case
is the result of knowledge ‘‘overflow’’ and not of knowledge depletion.
Bonaccorsi recently argued in a similar way (2007; 2008). While scientists may
adhere to same underlying paradigms, they ‘‘still diverge on more specific theories
that link this causal explanation to the various levels of organization of life’’. The
result is again a ‘‘proliferation of specialized sub-theories’’. ‘‘Divergence’’ is one of
the main characteristics of the ‘‘new sciences’’ like nanotechnology or biotechnology.
Based on ideas of Kuhn (1968), ‘‘finalisation theory’’ distinguished different phases
of cognitive development. Above all in the ‘‘pre-paradigmatic phase’’, scientists are
attracted by the rise of a new paradigm and migrate to new fields, while it is the ‘‘post-
paradigmatic’’ phase, in which openness to ‘‘external’’ influences leads scientists to
specialise by applying their paradigm to an increasing number of different contexts
(van den Daele 1977; Weingart 1997).
These authors are united in the belief that the migration of scientists to new fields of
science is closely linked to the dynamics of cognitive structures. The search for new
knowledge opportunities drives the ‘‘epistemic agent’’ to conquer new fields by migration.
The ‘‘Strong Programme’’ and Scientific Migration
The other approaches fit into a conceptual vision based on what Bloor (1976) and
others have called the ‘‘strong programme’’ in science which emphasises social and
Why do Scientists Migrate? A Diffusion Model 473
123
cultural elements in the determination of what scientific ‘‘truth’’ is. Cognitive
dynamics alone cannot explain scientific innovation and the scientist as an epistemic
agent is questioned. In our context, one can distinguish two lines of reasoning:
approaches that highligt competition and reputation seeking and those which stress
cooperation and communication as determinants of scientific migration.
Competition and Reputation Seeking
This line of reasoning discusses scientific innovation by treating scientists above all
as ‘‘reputation seekers’’ rather than epistemic agents. In this case, scientists,
motivated by the search for ‘‘reputation’’, enter into competition for the distribution
of reputation value. Latour and Woolgar have sketched scientific action as a
‘‘credibility cycle’’ based on reputation, which is – if successful - rewarded by
material advantages, which is again the base for further reputation seeking (Latour
and Woolgar 1979). As scientific reputation depends on the creation of new
knowledge, seeking reputation generates permanently new knowledge and therefore
scientific innovation.
Bourdieu has sketched scientific action as a continuing ‘‘struggle’’ for power,
which is based on reputation (or, in his terminology, ‘‘scientific capital’’) (Bourdieu
1975; Clark 1995; Kogan 2000; Whitley 2000; 2001). The ‘‘champ scientifique’’ is
subdivided into those who dominate and those who are dominated. Scientific
innovation is possible according to this concept because there is an incentive for those
who are dominated or who are still low in the social hierarchy to find cognitive fields
with a low number of competitors. This incentive pushes the ‘‘dominated’’ to seek for
unexplored fields in science. Newcomers to science or to a scientific field that is
already ‘‘taken’’ have a similar motivation. They can either try to follow the usual
steps to build a career and climb up the social ladder within the scientific field or
‘‘subvert’’ the power of the dominant ‘‘class’’ in this field by offering new paradigms
and thereby challenge established knowledge. These scientists are therefore driven to
go into new and unexplored fields because of competition.
Chubin develops similar ideas when underlining the importance of ‘‘marginal
scientists’’ with ‘‘weak ties’’ in the scientific community for expanding the frontiers
of knowledge (Chubin 1976). This kind of scientist is less prone to the conservative
cognitive attitudes of the scientific establishment. Being a ‘‘newcomer’’, a ‘‘heretic’’
or ‘‘marginal’’ allows overcoming the existing ‘‘conservatism’’ of established
scientists (see also Dogan and Pahre 1990).
Ben-David speaks of ‘‘forerunners’’ instead of marginal scientists. He introduces
in addition the type of ‘‘founders’’. Founders have high scientific recognition and are
willing to build up new cognitive fields from the scratch together with ‘‘followers’’,
i.e. disciples, who decide to leave the scientific field they are working in because
new fields offer better competitive conditions (Ben-David 1965).
All these authors accept competition and reputation seeking as the underlying
driving mechanisms of cognitive development. The scientists who migrate often
have a particular position as ‘‘marginal scientists’’ or ‘‘newcomers’’ reflecting their
vulnerable position in the scientific competition for reputation.
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Invisible Colleges
Another strand takes in a decidedly different stance with regard to the kind of
scientists that are at the base of innovation. They underline, contrary to the authors
above, cooperation and communication in scientific fields within social circles as
the base for scientific migration. The networks of ‘‘scientific elites’’ - or of
‘‘invisible colleges’’ (De Solla Price 1963; 1971; Crane 1972) or still ‘‘core groups’’
(Fuchs 1993) - are responsible for the shifting of cognitive frontiers instead of
‘‘marginal scientists’’. These elites, which are nevertheless striving for reputation,
are in direct contact with each other, which leads to quick information flows and
communication. ‘‘Non-elite groups’’ or ‘‘followers’’ are less prone to the search for
reputation but are motivated by the search for a sufficient material base for
continuing their work. They take up the ideas developed by elites and transform
them into ‘‘normal science’’ by testing them and building up a teaching canon that is
at the base of specialties and disciplines. The ‘‘authority’’ of scientific elites based
on excellence and social networks, makes it easy to convince ‘‘followers’’ of the
value of migration. The stronger those networks are and the more authority the elite
has, the more rapid the diffusion of innovative knowledge takes place and the more
widely diffused the new ideas become.
In contrast to the other strand, the authors stressing the role of invisible colleges
do not see elites as the conservative establishment but as a particular group of top
scientists who are able to gather most of the attention in the scientific field. The
migration of scientists is therefore seen as a multi-stage process, in which scientific
elites conquer new fields of knowledge and particular types of social relations –
authority and networks – are responsible for the diffusion of these new fields.
The authors within this strand base their insights strongly on the diffusion theory
of Rogers (1995), which was originally published in the beginning of the 1960s.
Rogers analysed a large number of innovations in history and tried to find common
underlying mechanisms. We will come back to diffusion theory later on.
More recently, Frickel and Gross (2005) have attempted to formulate a more
integrative theory of migration or, in their terms, of ‘‘scientific/intellectual
movements’’, which combines elements of the cognitive and social approach to
science. They limit their field of interest to those ‘‘movements’’ that arise as a
‘‘protest movement’’ against established paradigms, discarding other possibilities of
specialty or sub-specialty creation or of the construction of interdisciplinary fields.
For them the motivation of scientists has two origins: it is certainly based on
‘‘structure’’, the struggle for reputation in a competitive environment. But it is also
based on ‘‘grievance’’ and ‘‘dissatisfaction’’ with existing knowledge. Scientists
migrate because their intellectual aspirations are not met by the field (ibid.: 210).
For them - but this has also already been underlined by Lamont or Akerlind (see
above) - scientists have a multi-dimensional motivation structure. The epistemic
agent lives comfortably together with the reputation seeker. They add, however, two
other interesting elements to the discussion: One is their account of motivation and
behaviour of the scientific elite. For them, these elites can exactly become
‘‘innovators’’ because they ‘‘enjoy a type of access or freedom that others in the field
do not’’ have. They are ‘‘expected to present weird ideas; they are freed from
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normative constraints and encouraged to be playful and creative’’ (ibid.: 212),
among others because they are established and do not risk anymore to become
sanctioned. Not marginalists but elites are the ones that can work at the boundaries
of existing knowledge. The second point is that science and scientific migration
need resources and opportunities to develop. Money and employment and the
institutions managing these resources play a critical role for success.
Frickel and Gross have pointed to the need of finding a more integrative theory of
scientific migration. The strength of their argument is that they demonstrate the
possibility of combining different causal elements discussed in the literature on
scientific migration. The literature usually has stressed one or the other of these
elements in putting forward their arguments discarding other elements from the
causal matrix. Like Frickel and Gross, we believe that the numerous studies
presented above indicate the causal importance of the various elements (like
intellectual curiosity, reputation seeking, the structure of cognitive fields etc.) and
that there is no need to put all explanatory value on only one variable. The problem
is, however, how to combine these elements in such a way that we understand the
relative value of each variable in decision situations with regard to scientific
migration. Frickel and Gross stress the conjunction of different elements but fail to
explain whether there is a rank-ordering of elements or if all elements have an equal
role, to what extent situational factors matter in comparison to motivational
elements, or how different career stages change the causal model. What one needs,
therefore, is a concept to grasp at the interplay of these different elements.
A Choice Model of Scientific Migration1
We conceptualise migration of scientists as a choice situation: the researcher must
decide if or if not he or she will take the step of working in a newly developing
scientific field. On what decision-making variables will the researcher base his or
her decision?
Our choice model is – as Kitcher’s (1995) – based on expected utility theory,
meaning that the researcher is seen as a ‘‘rational’’ actor (Braun 2003) who acts under
uncertainty about the outcome of his or her actions. This is the reason the researcher
must assume probabilities that a certain event may take place or not (Esser 1993).
We start by identifying the ‘‘expected utility function’’ of scientists that we see
composed, on the one hand, of the ‘‘pay-offs’’ a certain investment will bring to the scientist
and, on the other hand, of the ‘‘effectiveness’’ of the investments linked to migration.
Pay-Offs
The ‘‘pay-offs’’ for scientists are determined on the base of two assessments: first, by
looking – following the ‘‘competition’’ approach – at the likely increase in reputation
migration can bring to the scientist and, second, by judging on the resources that can be
1 The general model was first developed together with Fabrizio Gilardi in the context of policy change
and diffusion (Braun and Gilardi 2006).
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expected for doing research in the case of leaving the existing field. Reputation and
resources – or in the terminology used by Bourdieu ‘‘scientific capital’’ and ‘‘economic
capital’’ – are, as demonstrated by Latour and Woolgar, the two components of the
‘‘credibility cycle’’ scientists are involved in (Latour and Woolgar 1979). We assume
that the interests of scientists are to gain as much reputation as possible and to have a
maximum of resources at their disposition in order to do research.
Expected returns in terms of reputation in the new field are compared with the
field the scientist is working in at the moment. A higher expected return of
reputation in the new field will contribute to a positive decision about migration.
There are different kinds of resources scientists would hope to get for their
research work when reflecting about going into a new area like for example having
more time for doing research or dispose of a better infrastructure. We think that
‘‘employment prospects’’ are most of the time the main variable scientists take into
consideration when determining the pay-offs of migration. The estimation of the
value of employment for the scientist depends on his or her employment situation in
the old field. Some researchers have tenure and any investment into a new scientific
field may not result in a risk in losing the employment. Others, especially younger
scientists, may not yet have any secure employment position. Investments into a
new scientific field need therefore clear prospects of getting a paid salary.
In sum, both reputation chances and resource prospects are essential elements in
determining the utility function of the scientist. Together they define to an important
part the propensity for switching research domains. The chances that a scientist will
invest into the new area are high when expectations about reputation and resource gains
are positive. They remain high as long as either expectations from reputation gains or
from resources are strong enough to outbalance possible negative effects on the other
side. In other words, the researcher might still migrate if he or she calculates that the
investment will make him or her much more famous than before in the scientific
community even though resources taken together might actually decrease in
comparison to the status quo. For example, a new employment position may have a
lower salary or the infrastructure is worse than before etc. And this also holds vice versa.
If we want therefore to include resources in the utility function together with
reputation, one must add weighting factors for each part. This means that the scientist
can value reputation and resource gain differently depending on his or her individual
dispositions and contextual conditions. The overall value given to utility is therefore
composed of the relative weight given to reputation in relation to the relative weight
given to resources. The following formula summarises these conclusions.
Ui ¼ wRi þ 1  wð ÞRESi; 0w 1
where Ui is the pay-off for scientist i; w is a weight factor; Ri is the expected
reputation in the area for scientist i; RESi is the expected employment gain in the
area for scientist i.
Effectiveness
The literature on the cognitive dynamics of science but also in part the literature on
the social dynamics of science has pointed to the importance of scientific discovery
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and cognitive advancement for scientists. We believe that this part of scientists’ life
and motivation should not be left out of the decision formula. Scientists are not only
‘‘reputation-’’ and ‘‘resource-’’ maximising but they are also ‘‘epistemic agents’’
with profound and genuine interests into scientific advancement of knowledge.
This aspect of epistemic curiosity should be integrated by the notion of
‘‘effectiveness’’: the researcher must, in order to invest into a new field, also be
convinced that he or she will find better solutions for scientific problems than
before. The existing concept, theory, method or practice may yield a certain amount
of satisfactory answers to a given problem. This certain amount can be called the
‘‘effectiveness’’ of a research theory, concept, method or practice (identified by a
parameter ‘‘m’’). But the effectiveness can be contested by alternative theories,
methods, and promising discoveries in new fields of science.
Effectiveness is part of expected utilities of scientists. In this way the decision
formula can be extended in the following way.
EU(i) ¼ mUi; 0m 1
where EUi = expected utility of scientist in the existing field; m = effectiveness of
existing theory, concept, method, practice; Ui is the pay-off for the scientist
composed of the elements reputation and resources within the existing field.
Summing up, the expected utility function in the scientific field the scientist is
actually working in consists of the pay-offs in terms of reputation and resources, on
the one hand, and of the effectiveness of existing theories, methods etc., on the
other. Both parts are not independent from each other: the overall expected utility
will be lower if the effectiveness of the existing knowledge is not satisfying and it is
also lower if reputation expectations in the existing field are low because of, for
example, strong competition by other scientists. The overall expected utility is
therefore the product of reputation and resource expectations, on the one hand, and
effectiveness, on the other.
If we now want to integrate the comparative aspect that is at the base of the final
decision of scientists to migrate into the model, we must imagine that a similar
expected utility function exists with regard to the new scientific field under
discussion.
EU(j) ¼ nUj; 0 n 1
where EU(j) is the expected utility of a scientist in the new field; n is the
effectiveness attributed to the alternative new field and Uj is the pay-off function
associated with the new field.
The scientist is put before the choice of accepting the status quo option, i.e. to
remain a ‘‘member’’ within the existing scientific field, or to opt for a research
career in the new field. This new field is then screened for its possible pay-offs and
its effectiveness and put into comparison with the expected utility and effectiveness
of the status quo. In order to go into the new field the following condition must hold:
EU(change) ¼ nUj [ mUi
A decreasing ‘‘m’’ will, for example, initiate search behaviour of the scientist in
quest for better alternatives, even though utility may remain unchanged (reputation
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and resource expectations from the existing position). And the expected utility of a
scientist can remain high even though reputation or resource expectations may
decrease as long as ‘‘m’’ remains very high and compensates this loss or, in other
words, if the existing way to find scientific solutions is satisfactory and no better
alternatives are visible.
The chance for migration of scientists are, on the base of what has been said until
now, high if the new scientific field
• generates expectations of higher reputation gain than in the case of a stay in the
existing field;
• increases the expectations concerning resources, above all employment
conditions;
• seems to have more promising answers to research questions
Costs
The expected utility of a new scientific field compared to the expected utility of the
existing field is not sufficient in order to understand the decision rationale of
scientists. Until now we have discussed the likely benefits of scientific action. Costs
are the other side of the coin and must be integrated into the decision-making
formula.
There are three kinds of costs the scientist has to take into account when deciding
about entry into a new scientific field: cognitive, social, and material.
Cognitive Costs
Cognitive costs are most important in the decision-making of the scientist. They are
generated when the scientist has to learn new concepts, theories or methods and apply
them. The more ‘‘distant’’ the available knowledge of the scientist is with regard to
the new theory etc., the more time investment it needs to overcome this cognitive
distance. In other words, the closer the new scientific field is to the existing field the
scientist is working in, the lower are the cognitive costs of transition.
Social Costs
Similar considerations can be put forward when dealing with ‘‘social costs’’. These
costs refer to the ‘‘epistemic’’ networks the scientist is working in. The literature on
invisible colleges has emphasised the positive effects networks have for the
diffusion of new ideas. It is, however, not said that ‘‘fore-runners’’ and the scientific
elite respectively can maintain their networks once they decide to build up a new
scientific field. Again, this may depend on the cognitive distance of the new field
with the existing one, in which social networks were created.
If the cognitive distance is relatively high, the migrating scientist may face a loss
of existing networks and needs to build up new ones. The transaction costs involved
in the establishment of ‘‘epistemic communities’’ are lower the more scientists have
already entered the new scientific field.
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Material Costs
Material costs reflect the investments scientists have to make when exercising
research in the new field. Such costs are different from one ‘‘science’’ to another and
also from one discipline to the other. Humanities, for example, need little equipment
while physicists’ research work demands expensive laboratories or research centres.
The money and infrastructure needed to do research and the effort it costs to obtain
such resources reflect the material costs.
In sum, to leave well-established scientific fields generates costs – cognitive,
social and material ones. These costs are part of the decision-making considerations
of actors and are set in relation to the benefits expected from migration. In this
sense, costs have to be deduced from expected utility.
Probabilities
The final decision component a researcher has to take into account is the likelihood
that investments into a new field can and will be successful or, in other words, that
the new field can be institutionalised and serve utility enhancement of the scientist.
Such probabilities depend in our view on two context conditions:
First, on the resistance of existing disciplines which might feel threatened in their
existence or identity if the new field develops. Such resistance can result in
difficulties to create employment and might deter potential scientists in the old field
to migrate.
Second, it also needs financial support of key institutions like funding agencies
and research organisations that flag out their willingness to invest into the new area.
If such a support is lacking, scientists reflecting about migration might not develop
the needed trust to leave their own field for an uncertain future.
The estimation of probabilities to succeed or fail will be included in the decision
formula by using a factor ‘‘p’’. P estimates the probability of success if migrating to
a new field. There is a probability for success of 1-p if the scientist remains in the
existing area. The more factors appear to be negative when estimating the chances
of success, the lower the utility of migrating will become. These considerations are
expressed in the following formula:
EUðchangeÞ ¼ pnUj þ 1  pð ÞmUi  C; 0 p 1; C [ 0
where C are the costs and p the probability.
This formula can then be broken down by simple arithmetic to:
að Þ EUðchangeÞ ¼ pnUj þ 1  pð ÞmUi  C [ mUi
bð Þ EUðchangeÞ ¼ nUj  mUi [ C=p
Illustrating the Choice Model
For the sake of illustration, let us discuss a number of hypothetical but typical cases
of choice about scientific migration and interpret them in the light of our choice
model.
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1. The most frequent case of building a new field of science is certainly the
development of specialties within a discipline or of sub-specialties within a
specialty. They are, in the terminology of Bonaccorsi, ‘‘divergencies’’, i.e. new
fields that are still united by a common roof, an overarching paradigm, concept
or methodology, but which tackle until now unexplored questions and objects.
The development of the new field may need adaptation of methodologies and
development of new concepts but its establishment usually does not question
the fundamentals of the mother discipline/specialty. Examples of such
divergencies are abundant. In the social sciences, one could, for example,
think of the development of comparative political science within political
science, of social psychology within psychology, or of medieval history in
historical science.
It seems that the choice of scientists to migrate into these areas when they were in
the making is influenced positively by the various decision variables.
If we take pay-offs first, the following can be suggested: Most of the time
migration in the case of divergence is ‘‘short-term’’. As a consequence, reputation
acquired in the mother discipline or specialty can usually be maintained, while
reputation in the new field can be built up gradually. The new reputation is seen as a
complement to the already existing one. At the same time, specialisation allows
‘‘competitive advantage’’ for the migrating scientist – at least in the beginning –
because of the smaller numbers of scientists active in the new field. The chances to
increase reputation quickly are better than in the case of staying in the old field. To
obtain secure employment in the new field may for quite some time – as long as
there is no recognition as a specialty or subspecialty – be difficult but the strong
anchorage in the mother discipline/specialty allows continuing to apply for
professorships in the broader field and find a stable position. Overall, therefore, pay-
offs seem to be positive.
The investment into the new field is inspired by, on the one hand, ‘‘grievance’’
about the potential of existing concepts to explain phenomena of interest to the
scientist and the discovery of alternative or new concepts or methodologies that
seem to better explain these phenomena. Effectiveness of the new field is therefore
judged superior to existing explanations but there is still uncertainty and it needs
consolidation of the new concepts by research to raise effectiveness substantially
(‘‘n’’) in comparison to existing explanations (‘‘m’’).
Consolidating new concepts and methodologies need cognitive investments and
raise therefore costs but these costs should be limited as basic anchorage in existing
paradigms and concepts remain. Social costs can be considered as being low
because links to the mother discipline/specialty remain alive and existing networks
will continue to exist while at the same time new ones can be established. Material
costs depend completely on the kind of resources that are needed in the new field
and can vary.
Probabilities are in principle quite high: Specialty and subspecialty formation
do not cause major resistance by scientists in the mother discipline/specialty or
adjacent specialties/subspecialties as long as the new field is sufficiently distinct
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in its cognitive orientation. The recognition of common overarching paradigms
contributes to the understanding with other specialties and scientists in the mother
discipline. Support by funders and research organisations should be available
without too much difficulties as the new field is, because of its relative cognitive
proximity, seen as a contribution to the development of these already recognised
mother disciplines/specialties.
All in all then, one sees that pay-offs and also to a lesser extent effectiveness can
easily outweigh ‘‘mUi’’, the expected utility of the existing field, while costs remain
limited and probabilities to establish the new area are relatively high. C/p is as a
consequence small. Migration is therefore likely, as long as we make abstraction of
‘‘timing’’ and ‘‘risk profiles’’, a topic we will discuss within the section on diffusion.
2. Without going into too much detail we can add a special case of divergence,
similar in its outlines to the one discussed above but with special characteristics
we often find in natural and life sciences.
Imagine a scientific field in which some fundamental questions have been
unsolved for quite some time. It is obvious that the answers to these questions will
result in high reputation of the scientist giving the answers. The main obstacle,
however, is to find adequate methods in order to be able to answer these questions.
One can think here, for example, of the development of genomics as a specialty in
molecular biology. Molecular biology was able to develop after Watson and Crick
deciphered the structure of DNA in 1953. The understanding, however, of the
composition of the genome of living beings and in particular of the human genome
remained a mystery until new methods (polymerase chain reaction; automated DNA
sequencing; the development of computer technology and special software and their
use in genome sequencing) were found and implemented. This gave rise to
genomics as a new field.
In this case again, scientists embarking on the road of discovery of these methods
in order to answer the pertinent questions do not travel long in their conceptual
development, which is firmly anchored in molecular biology and they can maintain
a large part of their scientific capital acquired in this field. Possible reputation gain is
even more promising than in the example above as the new methods promise to find
answers to long asked questions (as, for example, the composition of the human
genome). In due consequence, resistance to this scientific quest by scientists in the
mother discipline is not to be expected. Financial investments were already starting
to increase after the DNA structure was deciphered. There was a strong existing
interest by funders and research organisation to go further. Overall, probabilities to
succeed were therefore high.
The main difference with the previous case are probably the high costs that are
involved in this intellectual enterprise. Cognitive costs to learn the new methods
were considerable and the sums of money needed for developing the new methods
and apply them were substantial. Most important, however, is effectiveness. There
are two different phases of development and therefore decision-making in this case:
during the first phase there is the search for finding the new methods. The
effectiveness of the new field to be developed must still be considered as very low
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as it is very uncertain that the search will be successful. The low ‘‘n’’ reduces ‘‘nUj’’
considerably in relation to ‘‘mUi’’. Once methods became known, effectiveness
could become very high. Even the high costs of investment (cognitive, material)
could not outweigh anymore the decision of scientists to start to invest into the new
area: high reputation was guaranteed for the first movers and support of funders was
there. From this point onwards migration to genomics became a very viable option
for molecular biologists.
3. Let us, finally, briefly present a negative case for migration in which most
decision variables are unfavourable for the decision of scientists to migrate.
Psychoanalysis is a case in point. One can consider Freud’s theoretical propositions
as an alternative paradigm in the field of psychology and psychiatry, which contested
fundamentally – and this has not changed until today – existing paradigms and
concepts. The contestation of existing knowledge raised in contrast to the preceding
cases a completely different reaction by scientists in the old fields. Resistance to
integrate the new field into the university could be expected. A further disadvantage in
this respect was also the strong linkage to medical practice and the use of private
practice as a place of research. Academic resistance and concomitant lack of support
from scientific organisations resulted in low expectations about the possibility of
reputation gains when migrating to psychoanalysis as well as about employment
possibilities. Under these circumstances it needed very strong ‘‘grievance’’ with
existing knowledge and strong intellectual curiosity, as well as a firm conviction that
the new field would result in more advanced knowledge, to make scientists move.
Unfortunately, demonstrations of effectiveness were and have remained difficult and
effectiveness was not helped by the intellectual scissions that followed quickly
between Freud and some of his followers. To this can be added that the transaction
costs to go into psychoanalysis were particularly high especially because of the long
time it took to learn the basics of psychoanalytic treatment.
If we summarise this in terms of our choice model, one sees quickly that C/p was
for scientists higher than the sum of nUj – mUi. Reputation and employment
prospects in the new field were low and effectiveness doubtful. It needed indeed a
strong belief in the explanatory potential and a low weighting of reputation to give
an incentive to scientists to reflect migration. In general, remaining in the old area
seemed to be more promising. The probabilities to really establish the field in a
long-term perspective were low while transaction costs were considerable. The
result were low incentives for scientists to invest into the new area. Psychoanalysis
has never overcome these deficiencies.
Diffusion
The next section will address the problem of scientific migration from a different
angle. The decision formula developed above is conceived as a decision of
individual scientists based on the information available, their expectations and
weighting of preferences. To fertilise the grounds of a new scientific field does,
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however, mean that an increasing number of scientists must take the same decision,
i.e. to migrate. Diffusion theory has taught us that decisions of scientists may be
taken individually but they are not independent of decisions of fellow scientists.
Migration can be seen as a collective action problem and one should ask how it is
possible that not only one but an increasing number of scientists are willing to work
in the new field.
Diffusion theory, as presented for example by Rogers (1995), helps to understand
how the process is taking place: innovations take place by following an ‘‘S-shaped’’
curve indicating the number of adoptions during a certain time period. This insight
was taken up by the ‘‘invisible colleges’’ literature. While usually the adoption of an
innovation – in our case of the decision to migrate - has a slow start with first only a
few innovators and then ‘‘early adopters’’, after a certain time a quick rise in
numbers is taking place seeing the inflow of ‘‘early majorities’’. When the
innovation has become already well-known, the number of adopters coming in
decreases considerably (‘‘late majorities’’ and ‘‘late-comers’’). If one observes only
the number of new adopters coming into the field, the curve by contrast is ‘‘bell-
shaped’’ with the highest number of new adopters in the mid-term of the innovation
and then gradually decreasing in the course of time until no new adopter is found. If
one accepts these findings as relevant also for intellectual migration, how can our
choice model help to explain this dynamic pattern?
What one can learn from diffusion theory is that, first, time matters: the longer an
innovation exists the more the conditions of adoption, or in our case of entry into the
new field, vary. Scientists going into the new field in the very beginning face very
different conditions than the ones digging for the last available ideas. Second, risk-
profiles of adopters and, hence, of scientists are different. Risk-takers advance fast
while risk-minimisers will come in very late. Risk-profiles depend on personal
attributes but to a large extent also on context conditions. Let us first elaborate the
relationship of time, the development of the field and migration.
Time Matters
There are two variables that change with time. The first one was presented by
Holton (1962) when he described new scientific fields as stocks of yet undiscovered
ideas that are limited. Early adopters have the best opportunities for discovery while
laggards will need to scratch very hard to still make discoveries in this field. Each
scientific field has, therefore, its ‘‘time’’ – a period of discovery, exploitation and
depletion. If one accepts this as a basic characteristic of intellectual development in
scientific fields, this should have implications for the various decision variables of
intellectual migration. The second variable refers to the number of scientists active
in the field. A few active scientists create a different condition for entry than if there
are already a large number exploiting the field.
If we keep these two variables in mind, how do they affect the different
components of the choice model?
Effects on the weighting of reputation gain when entering the new field vary in
time. This can be best demonstrated by sketching the two curves of development
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of the ‘‘stock of ideas’’ and of the ‘‘number of scientists’’ on a diagram (compare
Holton 1962: 389) (Fig. 1).
The implications for reputation are straightforward: The highest reputation can
be gained (originality) by innovators or fore-runners who are making the discovery.
They are almost alone in the field so that reputation cannot be contested by other
scientists and they profit from the originality of their findings. Early adopters will
see more scientists next to them entering the field but the numbers are still relatively
limited so that the chances to win reputation remain high, especially also because
the number of undiscovered ideas is still very high. This begins to change when
early majorities and especially when late majorities come in. In the latter case, the
field is already crowded by scientists so that one finds high competition for
reputation while the number of available unexplored ideas begins to decline
considerably. New ideas become a ‘‘scarce good’’. This leads gradually to decisions
of several scientists to leave the field and seek for better reputation conditions.
The number of scholars starts to decline. Late-comers, finally, have few chances to
increase their reputation when entering the field. Though the number of scholars left
in the field is now becoming quite small, unexplored ideas will be very hard to find.
Reputation chances decline therefore the longer the field exists. They are highest in
the beginning but innovators and even early adopters are bearing a high risk that the
field cannot be developed and that investments may have been in vain.
Similar considerations can be made for the other components of the decision
formula:
Fig. 1 Development of ideas and scholars in scientific fields over time
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• Resources like employment will be hard to find in the initial period, when few
investments are made into the new area. With time and success secure
employment positions will increase.
• The effectiveness of the new field increases with time as more and more
research will demonstrate the knowledge gain in an increasing number of
objects.
• Cognitive costs will probably not sharply decline as most of the time entry into
the new area is linked to the learning of new methods, concepts etc. But with
time a process of standardisation and communication of knowledge develops
that facilitates access to the new field.
• Social costs decline because more and more networks will exist in the course of
time where new researchers can be integrated. This does not lower the costs of
leaving old networks but integration processes proceed quicker with time.
• Material costs will not change if research needs certain equipment. Costs for
such equipment are usually not flexible.
• Probabilities, finally, may increase with time for two reasons: if there has been
resistance to the new field by existing disciplines or specialties, such resistance
will be more easily overcome by institutionalisation and continuing success.
This raises the probability that one can be successful in the new area. In
addition, it is likely that more scientific elites are drawn into the area, especially
in the period of early adopters and that good research institutes start to invest
within the new field. This creates trust in the new area and increases therefore
probabilities of success for new adopters.
What does this mean for the choice model?
The timing when to enter a new field has an effect on the value of the variables
that constitute the decision formula. This means that also incentives to migrate
change with the development of the new field.
In the beginning period with high costs and low probabilities, uncertain resources
and effectiveness, the sum of nUj – mUi will seldom be larger than C/p for most
scientists. It needs a certain risk profile, above all linked to ‘‘effectiveness’’, to make
the sum higher than the product out of costs and probabilities (see below the risk
profiles). At a later stage, reputation gain decreases considerably while costs decline
and probabilities increase. Effectiveness and employment prospects increase also. It
is therefore above all the weight given to reputation in the new field, which decides
about migration in later stages. In the later period under late majorities one sees that
the decline of reputation prospects can be judged so low that newly developing
fields start to have a better chance to be selected for research.
Risk Profiles
Rogers introduced different types of adopters. He believed that these groups could
be explained by psychological characteristics but also by their social status,
education, and social connectedness (Rogers 1995). These criteria seem plausible
but are derived inductively rather than deductively, i.e. from the point of view of a
theoretical model. The last step in the presentation of our choice model therefore is
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the interpretation of the different ‘‘adopter groups’’ or ‘‘risk groups’’ in the light of
the variables that compose the choice model.
Fore-Runners
Fore-runners or innovators are the first to enter the scientific field and make original
discoveries. As the previous section demonstrates, such scientists face considerable
costs, lack probably resources, must cope with high uncertainties about effective-
ness but have the chance of astounding wins on the reputation side. Their aim is not
the building of a new scientific field but of making original discoveries. This limited
objective explains why fore-runners can indeed advance without taking too much
risk: As they do not intend to construct a new field, they do not need to take
probabilities into account and their costs remain relatively low: social costs do not
come up as innovators usually maintain their established networks and cognitive
costs exist only in the investment to solve the scientific problems they are facing.
Material costs may exist in order to finance the necessary experiments etc. In other
words, C/p tends to decline to zero. On the other side, one can assume that fore-
runners are highly motivated by grievances about existing knowledge and that they
value new discoveries (‘‘effectiveness’’) very high. As discoveries are usually made
by senior scientists already belonging to the ‘‘scientific elite’’ (‘‘invisible colleges’’)
or are even ‘‘stars’’ (Zuccala and van den Besselaar 2005), they will have a secured
employment position. Reputation remains important for fore-runners. Being part of
the elite, competition for reputation is particularly intense and only ‘‘original’’
contributions may really create the necessary recognition for these scientists. Risks
of failure are also reduced because, as Frickel and Scott suggest (see above), usually
one expects them to be weird and try out new ideas. In sum, it is easily to be seen
why the decision in favour of ‘‘running into no-man’s land’’ can be taken by this
particular group. Highly motivated by intellectual curiosity and the need of
continuing high reputation gain while risks to fail remain limited and costs low,
these scientists strive for originality.
Founders
Fore-runners may, once the discovery has been made, decide to leave the
exploitation of the discovery to others and move on or they may decide to stay and
become ‘‘founders’’ (Ben-David 1991: 54).
If they decide to stay, costs in institutionalising the new field will start to matter.
Social costs by contrast will usually be low as high-standing scientists will have
durable and encompassing networks in their existing working fields. Cognitive costs
exist in so far as the new field now has to be explored and adequate concepts need to
be developed. Material costs will increase in order to develop the new area.
Probabilities must now also be taken into account: it depends if the new field is
contesting existing fields and therefore if it creates resistance and if financial
resources can be found to support the building process. The person of the founder
itself can positively contribute to such a support.
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Founders are, as fore-runners, highly motivated by intellectual curiosity and the
intensive search for reputation gain at an already high level of credibility. The
difference with the fore-runners consists in their different judgment of where better
opportunities lie: fore-runners think that only continuing original contributions can
maintain their place in the scientific elite. Founders, by contrast, opt for the
elaboration of the new field in order to add to their reputation stock. Their advantage
is that they can base their research activities in the new field on the discovery made.
‘‘N’’ is therefore higher than in the case of the fore-runner who has to deal with
considerable uncertainty about effectiveness of his or her investments.
Early Adopters
Early adopters differ above all from the previous group because they enter into the
field after the discovery has been made with the intention of staying there for quite
some time. They consider themselves as the ‘‘explorers’’ of the scope, the limits and
possibilities of the new field.
This risk group is very much attracted by reputation gains that are still very
promising as only fore-runners and founders have until now entered the field. It is
very likely that this group, which faces important transaction costs and low
probabilities of success, despite first discoveries, has an inferior position in existing
fields of science and sees in the new field excellent conditions to accelerate their
strife for reputation. It is most likely that these scientists are the ‘‘Young Turks’’
Becher and Trowler mention (Becher and Trowler 2001: 99) or ‘‘Juniors’’ (Zuccala
and van den Besselaar 2005) who have ‘‘as yet made no major intellectual
commitments’’ and who have ‘‘little to lose by investing in potentially high-risk,
high-profit commodities’’ (Becher and Trowler 2001, ibid.). Younger scientists face
less loss of social costs and have often still less invested in their previous cognitive
field so that transaction costs of migration remain low. Their position is often also
not secured which adds to their mobility. Finally, they are often associated to a
founder with whom they start their career. This proximity makes it easy to follow
the moves of the elite scientists.
Early adopters can gain high reputation as their work – the first exploration of the
confines and contents of the new area – can still be considered at least in part as
original contributions.
Early Majorities
This group of scientists is attracted when the first ‘‘measurements’’ in the new field
have been made and confines have been defined. The group is important to deepen
out the knowledge to confirm or contest it, to build on a common paradigm and,
thus, contribute to its development and diffusion. They are the ‘‘constructors’’
Dogan and Pahre have proposed as one of three idealtypes of migrating scientists
(Dogan and Pahre 1990: 223). Their reputation prospects are more moderate than in
the case of the first groups as originality is by now gone and there are a larger
number of competitors struggling for credibility. On the other side, effectiveness of
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the new field is becoming more visible, research money is more easily available and
social costs decrease with the larger number of scientists now entering the field.
Transaction costs are, nevertheless, still high and probabilities remain moderate as it
is up to these scientists to prove the worthiness of long-term investments into the
field. Scientists in this group are probably, as Becher and Trowler suggest (p. 95),
‘‘disenchanted with their current line of research – usually because it is, or they
themselves are, apparently going stale – and who are therefore looking out for
promising fresh departures’’. Another obvious reason are decreasing reputation
chances in the old field because of depletion and/or a high number of competitors.
This group of scientists usually has already some achievements and some
reputations but is still eager to become part of ‘‘upper class’’ in science or even
of the elite group. They are still ‘‘hungry’’ enough to be constantly on the lookout
for new opportunities. However, they have more to lose than the Young Turks when
migrating to new fields because of existing social networks and already considerable
investments in existing cognitive areas. They may also have already secure
employment positions while the new field can still create uncertainty about future
employment prospects.
Late Majorities
This risk group is not anymore motivated by reputation gain. They are the
‘‘followers’’, as Fuchs has defined them (Fuchs 1993), who see above all a chance to
secure ‘‘material advantages’’ when migrating. And at this stage of diffusion, resource
prospects have become clearer and more advantageous than in the beginning as
already a considerable number of scientists is working in the field and has gathered
research money or even employment positions in public research organisations.
Infrastructure will be built up. There are still improvements to be made – and the late
majorities are above all there to consolidate the new field by standardisation of the
findings; they are not exploring but are now furnishing the ‘‘house’’ in order to make it
comfortable – so that resources will keep flowing in and these scientists have a chance
to improve their position. Late majorities are not risk-prone, on the contrary. They
like transaction costs to be minimised and need higher probabilities that the field will
continue to exist in order to migrate. Their social status in the old field will usually not
be very high and they lack the aspiration of still moving up the career ladder.
Late-Comers
Late-comers, finally, come into the field when many other scientists have already
left to explore new fields. They leave their old field mostly because most others have
already done so before. They are not interested in ‘‘innovation’’ or in ‘‘exploring’’,
‘‘constructing’’ or ‘‘consolidating’’. Their task is to participate in the elaboration of
the last remaining questions or help to vulgarise the new area. They are very risk-
averse. In their decision-making, the decrease of employment chances in the old
field is the most significant reason for migration, which raises the chances of
scientific survival in the new area.
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Conclusions
The intention of this article was to improve our understanding of the reasons
underlying the intellectual migration of scientists from well-known cognitive
domains to nascent scientific fields. To that purpose we presented, first, a number of
findings from the sociology of science that give different insights about this
phenomenon. We then attempted to bring some of these insights together under the
conceptual roof of an actor-based approach linking expected utility and diffusion
theory. Intellectual migration is regarded as the rational choice of scientists who
decide under uncertainty and on the base of a number of decision-making variables,
which define probabilities, costs, and benefits of the migration.
Diffusion theory was used to demonstrate the typical dynamics of the migration
process in science. We endeavoured to link the insights of diffusion theory to
decision-making variables and identified different types of scientists who could
fit into the categorisation of actor groups diffusion theory has developed,
i.e. ‘‘innovators’’, ‘‘early adopters’’; ‘‘early majority’’, ‘‘late majority’’ and
‘‘late-comers’’.
We believe that modelling decision-making of scientists has the advantage of
identifying, as Kitcher explains (Kitcher 1995), relevant variables and their causal
interrelationships. This permits to formulate reasoned expectations under what
conditions scientists will engage into certain behaviour. The usefulness of such a
model is therefore in its heuristic value: it permits to focus on those variables
that have been identified in the literature as probable explanations of migration
behaviour and suggest interaction effects between them. The decision-making
formula itself can then be an instrument to define expectations and hypotheses about
the behaviour of scientists.
This does not mean that institutions and structures would not matter. They do.
But they are seen as exogenous factors that create incentives or disincentives for
scientists and influence their estimations about the various decision-making
variables. The relationship of institutions and structures and scientists’ decisions
about migration must be elaborated further. In this article, it was important to
develop the micro-foundation of scientific behaviour. Future research should take
these insights as a starting point and test to what extent the development of new
scientific fields can be explained in terms of decision-making rationales of scientists
and follow the diffusion dynamics of innovation processes.
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